

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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NON-RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE REGIME ☆ ☆ ☆

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION: *By Graham H. Stuart* ☆



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Information, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.

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Non-Recognition of Argentine Regime

[Released to the press July 26]

I. THE BASIC ISSUES

1. The American republics jointly with all of the United Nations are engaged in a war of unprecedented magnitude for the protection and preservation of the liberties of each and all of them against the most powerful aggressors in history. In this war the United States has over eleven million of its own men under arms. Our men are fighting the enemy on every battle-front in the world, and tens of thousands of them will never return to partake of the privileges of that liberty for which they are now fighting. For generations to come our people will be called upon to discharge a debt of over two hundred billion dollars which represents our material contribution to the defeat of the enemy. To this common cause all but one of the American nations have been giving full and wholehearted support.

2. At this most critical moment in the history of the American republics, the Government of one great Republic, Argentina, has seen fit to take two steps which have resulted in tremendous injury to the Allied cause, to wit: (1) it has deliberately violated the pledge taken jointly with its sister republics to cooperate in support of the war against the Axis powers, and in thus deserting the Allied cause has struck a powerful blow at the whole system of hemispheric cooperation; (2) it has openly and notoriously been giving affirmative assistance to the declared enemies of the United Nations.

3. These are the fundamental issues which are now brought to a head by the actions of the present regime in Argentina. They relate immediately to the prosecution of the war. The enemies of American cooperation and the friends of Axis aggression would of course wish, and are indeed recommending, that the Argentine course of action be approved by the American republics through the establishment of full and normal relations with

the Farrell regime. This would have the effect of a public proclamation of complete approval of the Argentine action. For the American republics to take such a course would be seriously to damage the Allied cause and to undermine the principles which the united organization of the nations of this hemisphere has been resolutely supporting in the war against the Axis powers. The free republics of America are honor-bound to preserve the integrity of those principles and that organization, and to do so they must stand firm in their common fight against the Axis enemy.

II. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE HEMISPHERE

During the eight years prior to Pearl Harbor the American republics devoted their best efforts to perfect and strengthen the system of inter-American cooperation, so that if the wave of world aggression should reach this hemisphere they would be ready to act together for the common defense of their heritage. Great progress was achieved and a spirit of solidarity and unity was developed which justified the hope that any external threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere would meet a common and united resistance.

At the Eighth International Conference of American States in Lima in 1938 the American governments reaffirmed their solidarity and proclaimed their intention to make that solidarity effective in the event that the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American nation were threatened. By so doing they provided the spiritual foundation for the belief that in the event of aggression, the supreme test of unity would be fully met by each one of the 21 republics. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Panamá in 1939, upon the outbreak of war in Europe, was animated by the same spirit. Immediately following the occupation of France by Germany, the determination of the American

republics to maintain their solidarity and unity of action in the face of the threatened spread of Axis aggression to this hemisphere was unanimously proclaimed by the Foreign Ministers at Habana in July 1940 in the solemn pledge:

"That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration."

On the binding bases for continental defense thus established, the American Foreign Ministers, meeting at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, after Axis aggression had reached this hemisphere, were enabled quickly to agree on uniform measures to be taken by each nation in the political, economic, and military fields for the collective security of all of them. The measures adopted at Rio provided for an integrated total defense against the total attack of the Axis aggressors.

Firm adherence to the principles of these inter-American agreements by all of the republics would have created an unshakable tradition of hemispheric unity the benefits of which would have been felt for generations to come by all of our peoples. But when the real test came, the Government of one of those republics, Argentina, chose to pursue a divergent and separate course. The fact that even the most urgent considerations of the national security and independence of each of the American republics, including Argentina itself, have not influenced the Argentine Government to practice unity in time of war, completely invalidates any suggestion that the other American governments should recognize it on the assumption that such action would contribute to hemispheric unity after the war.

Efforts have been made to confuse the issue by charging that the policy followed by the American republics and their associates among the United Nations constitutes a departure from the normal rules and procedure with regard to recognition and amounts to intervention in the internal affairs of Argentina. This contention disregards completely the foundation on which the policy of non-recognition rests, namely, the defense and security of the hemisphere. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that this policy was adopted after full and free consultation among the American

republics and that it is the logical outgrowth of the multilateral agreements which all of them accepted in order to make that defense effective. The American republics have expressly declared that this policy does not affect, and has nothing to do with, the ordinary rules and procedure for recognition in time of peace. The problem involves the fundamental question of whether the American republics are to endorse the action of one republic which has undermined their unity and strength and given aid to the Axis enemy. It is not, as has sometimes been asserted, merely a question of relations between the United States and Argentina.

III. DEVELOPMENTS DURING FOUR MONTHS BETWEEN OVERTHROW OF RAMÍREZ GOVERNMENT AND RECALL OF AMBASSADOR ARMOUR

The government of General Ramírez announced the break of relations with Germany and Japan on January 26, 1944. It based its action on the criminal espionage activities which it declared were directly chargeable to the Axis governments and which, it asserted, "infringe the national sovereignty, compromise the foreign policy of this Government, and threaten the security of the continent". Repeated assurances were given by President Ramírez, the Foreign Minister, General Gilbert, and other responsible members of the Argentine Government, in public statements as well as private conversations, that immediate, energetic measures would be taken to suppress subversive Axis activities and in other ways to give effect to the severance of relations. Very soon, however, it became clear that powerful forces within the Government were determined to oppose those measures and render the break valueless. General Gilbert, who had played a leading role in the decision to break relations and the efforts thereafter to implement it, resigned as Foreign Minister on February 15. Ten days later General Ramírez "delegated" his authority as President to General Farrell and a few days thereafter submitted his resignation.

In view of these sudden developments nearly all of the American governments determined to abstain from normal relations with the Farrell regime in order to ascertain the reasons for this change and the attitude of the new regime toward the Axis. It has since been established that extremist, pro-Axis elements were responsible for the elimination of General Ramírez and his principal collaborators from the Government because

of their decision to break relations.

The Farrell government firmly refused to commit itself to implementation of the break with the Axis. It implicitly disavowed any intention to honor the rupture with the Axis by insisting repeatedly that it was due to foreign pressure.

This attitude was confirmed by its actions. The freedom of the country was extended to Axis diplomatic and consular officers. Affirmative assistance was given to Axis firms, both through large official contracts and through requisitioning of critical materials from firms friendly to the democratic cause. Immediately following the break of relations police activity and arrests of Axis agents were briefly stimulated by the Ramírez government, but under the new regime numerous Axis spies and agents were set at liberty. As a result Axis espionage again flourished. Such pro-Axis newspapers as *El Federal*, *Cabildo*, and *La Frontera* enjoyed governmental support and assistance in obtaining newsprint and carried on a bitter propaganda campaign against the United Nations and on behalf of the Axis. A commentary by *La Frontera* on the Allied landings in France exemplified this propaganda:

"It is most comforting that all the peoples of the Continent are closely grouped under the brilliant leadership of Hitler, who has been supernaturally transformed by developments into . . . more than an intrepid defender of Germany, he is the defender of Europe."

Nevertheless, from time to time certain elements in the Farrell government professed a desire to see the rupture implemented. Were such an attempt to be made, however, these same elements admitted that they would be eliminated as were Ramírez and Gilbert by the extremist forces within the Government. That the dominant power in Argentina was, and continues to be, in the hands of pro-Axis elements determined to impose their desires is strikingly revealed by this situation. Furthermore, it is significant that these same elements control the most important ministries and agencies of the National Government as well as the governments of the provinces and have rapidly and energetically implanted a domestic totalitarian system that fully complements and supports their pro-Axis foreign policy, through control of the press, the courts, the schools, and other key institutions. The basic civil rights have been either nullified or so modified as to have no

real meaning. Every effort was made to stamp out democratic opposition to the Government's totalitarian program. A striking demonstration of the nature of this program was afforded in the declarations of the Minister of War on June 10 when he said that military re-armament is the objective to which the entire economy of the country and the life of all of its people must be dedicated. The Minister admitted in so many words that the keystone of Argentina's international policy is to be military force, when he stated that in addition to the use of diplomacy to achieve political objectives it possessed the power of its armed forces.

Shortly after the Farrell regime came into power various of its members undertook to arrange interviews with members of the diplomatic corps in Buenos Aires through intermediaries. Ambassador Armour participated in two informal discussions of this kind, one with the Foreign Minister and the other with the Ministers of Foreign Relations, War and Navy. The Ambassador reported to this Department, and likewise informed his colleagues of the American diplomatic corps, that little or nothing was accomplished at either meeting, since the Foreign Minister insisted that recognition be accorded before implementation of the break with the Axis on the basis of Argentine promises of future action. Ambassador Armour was recalled, and a full statement of this Government's position was transmitted to the other American republics and to the Government of Great Britain on June 22.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE RECALL OF AMBASSADOR ARMOUR

We have reexamined the entire Argentine situation in the light of developments since our recall of Ambassador Armour.

Practically all of the other republics have expressed unqualified agreement with the position and statement of facts set forth in the Department's communication of June 22. The chiefs of mission of most of the American republics as well as the British Ambassador have been recalled for consultation.

The Chilean Chargé in Washington has informally made available to the Department two memoranda by the Farrell government, one dated June 30 and the other July 10, which profess to summarize the action taken by the Castillo administration, the government of General Ramírez

and the present regime, ostensibly in aid of the United Nations and in implementation of the break in relations with the Axis. The memorandum of July 10, which is the more comprehensive of the two documents, convincingly establishes the principal conclusion of our statement of June 22. That memorandum demonstrates that potentially significant anti-Nazi measures were adopted as incidents of the break in relations by the Ramírez government and that almost immediately after these measures were adopted the government was overthrown in circumstances and for reasons which are now well known. A mere notation of the dates of the decrees cited in the memorandum demonstrates that as soon as the new regime took power the program of implementation was sharply stopped. Save for the departure of the German diplomats, who enjoyed the freedom of the country for almost six months (and thus had ample time and opportunity to reorganize the Nazi espionage system), the sentencing of four Germans for espionage, and the suspension for a few days of one of several pro-Nazi papers, the Farrell regime has done little or nothing to implement the action of the Ramírez government. Thus the memoranda reinforce the conclusion that the extremist pro-Nazi elements of the present regime, which were largely responsible for the overthrow of the Ramírez government, have been able to block any efforts that might have been made to proceed vigorously and adequately against Axis activities. The basic facts with regard to political and economic defense measures remain as set forth in our statement. Furthermore, extremely important problems of Axis control were either not mentioned in the memoranda or were touched upon by carefully qualified promises of future action.

The net effect of the position of the Farrell regime is firm adherence to the thesis that recognition should be accorded on the basis of a few acts of the overthrown Ramírez government and mere promises of future performance. A declared determination to collaborate fully and decisively with the rest of the hemisphere has been and continues to be studiously avoided. The memorandum of June 30 states that, "*At the proper time the Argentine Government will take the necessary steps to make public the measures which it may adopt in consequence of its position of rupture.*" This is precisely the position of procrastination

and evasion adopted by the Argentine Government immediately after the Conference of Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 and maintained ever since.

At the very time that the Farrell regime was protesting its intention to collaborate with the United Nations this Government was receiving reports of actions conclusively establishing that a contrary policy was being pursued. The Department is in possession of irrefutable evidence that as late as the middle of June of this year the Argentine authorities required firms friendly to the United Nations to receive bids as subcontractors from Nazi firms on contracts calling for materials imported from the United Nations. It is definitely established that during the past three months large government contracts for public works were given to firms that were either of enemy origin or actively cooperating with the enemy. At late as July 4 the Ministry of Finance placed display advertisements in Axis papers *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung*, *Il Mattino d'Italia*, *El Federal*, and *La Fronda*. The June issue of the scurrilous Nazi publication *Clarínada* contained a full-page advertisement by the Ministry of Interior. Within the past two weeks newsprint imported under grant of Allied navicerts has been supplied with the aid of the Farrell government to the four papers mentioned, which day after day have been viciously attacking the United Nations while enthusiastically supporting the Axis cause and furthering Axis propaganda.

Although the Argentine memoranda refer to economic defense measures, the irrefutable fact is that internal controls over Axis firms are non-existent and that the Farrell government has in truth been aiding those firms. During the past three years representative Axis firms in Argentina have been able to double, and in some cases to treble, their normal peacetime profits. The prosperity of these powerful commercial firms, which have been geared according to the well-known pattern into the espionage and propaganda machine of the Nazi party, is the result not merely of passive failure of the Argentine Government to implement the Rio agreements but of positive aid from that Government.

There is, of course, nothing new in these developments. They merely demonstrate the futility of any effort to decide the issue of recognition by reference to isolated acts of apparent implementation of the break in relations. Since the day of

Axis aggression against this hemisphere Argentina has protested its solidarity and unity with its sister republics. But during two and one-half years it has persisted in an open, notorious, and contrary course of action which has given constant aid and comfort to the enemies of those republics. Spasmodic token gestures of cooperation have been made. In almost all instances, however, they have been designed to do no more than foster the false hope that Argentina might yet be prepared to honor her solemn pledge of hemisphere solidarity.

In the same manner, the superficial anti-Axis gestures of recent weeks have been calculated to weaken the collective determination of the non-recognizing governments. They have been part of an effort to induce those governments to accord recognition in exchange for promises of action which Argentina has long been pledged to take. Expediency in a desperate effort to achieve recognition, rather than a change of Argentine foreign policy to support the Allied cause in good faith, has inspired these actions of the Farrell regime.

The suggestion has been made that the recent gestures of the Farrell regime offer a basis for negotiation. Bargaining or negotiating with regard to action which Argentina has long since agreed to take would be a serious error. The principles for which the free nations of the world are today contributing the full measure of their human and material resources cannot be the subject of a bargain. The controlling issue is support in good faith of the Allied cause.

The injury to the solidarity of the Continent and to the war effort of the United Nations by the continuing acts and utterances of the Farrell regime is abundantly clear. It is the judgment of this Government that the American republics and their associates among the United Nations should firmly adhere to the present policy of non-recognition of the Farrell regime until by unequivocal acts it is conclusively demonstrated that there has been a fundamental change of Argentine policy in favor of the cause against the Axis and in support of inter-American unity and common action.

The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference

ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY¹

[Released to the press by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference July 22]

I am gratified to announce that the Conference at Bretton Woods has successfully completed the task before it.

It was, as we knew when we began, a difficult task, involving complicated technical problems. We came here to work out methods which would do away with the economic evils—the competitive currency devaluation and destructive impediments to trade—which preceded the present war. We have succeeded in that effort.

The actual details of an international monetary and financial agreement may seem mysterious to the general public. Yet at the heart of it lie the most elementary bread-and-butter realities of daily life. What we have done here in Bretton Woods is to devise machinery by which men and women everywhere can freely exchange, on a fair and stable basis, the goods which they produce through their labor. And we have taken the in-

itial steps through which the nations of the world will be able to help one another in economic development to their mutual advantage and for the enrichment of all.

The representatives of the 44 nations faced differences of opinion frankly and reached an agreement which is rooted in genuine understanding. None of the nations represented here has altogether had its own way. We have had to yield to one another not in respect to principles or essentials but in respect to methods and procedural details. The fact that we have done so, and that we have done it in a continuing spirit of good-will and mutual trust, is, I believe, one of the hopeful and heartening portents of our times. Here is a sign blazoned upon the horizon, written large upon the

¹ Delivered at the closing plenary session of the Conference, July 22, 1944. Mr. Morgenthau was President of the Conference and Chairman of the Delegation of the United States of America.

threshold of the future—a sign for men in battle, for men at work in mines and mills, and in the fields, and a sign for women whose hearts have been burdened and anxious lest the cancer of war assail yet another generation—a sign that the peoples of the earth are learning how to join hands and work in unity.

There is a curious notion that the protection of national interests and the development of international cooperation are conflicting philosophies—that somehow or other men of different nations cannot work together without sacrificing the interests of their particular nations. There has been talk of this sort—and from people who ought to know better—concerning the international cooperative nature of the undertaking just completed at Bretton Woods. I am perfectly certain that no delegation to this Conference has lost sight for a moment of the particular national interests it was sent here to represent. The American delegation, which I have had the honor of leading, has at all times been conscious of its primary obligation—the protection of American interests. And the other representatives here have been no less loyal or devoted to the welfare of their own people.

Yet none of us has found any incompatibility between devotion to our own countries and joint action. Indeed, we have found on the contrary that the only genuine safeguard for our national interests lies in international cooperation. We have come to recognize that the wisest and most effective way to protect our national interests is through international cooperation—that is to say, through united effort for the attainment of common goals. This has been the great lesson taught by the war and is, I think, the great lesson of contemporary life—that the peoples of the earth are inseparably linked to one another by a deep, underlying community of purpose. This community of purpose is no less real and vital in peace than in war, and cooperation is no less essential to its fulfilment.

To seek the achievement of our aims separately through the planless, senseless rivalry that divided us in the past, or through the outright economic aggression which turned neighbors into enemies, would be to invite ruin again upon us all. Worse, it would be once more to start our steps irrefragably down the steep, disastrous road to war. That sort of extreme nationalism belongs to an era that is dead. Today the only enlightened

form of national self-interest lies in international accord. At Bretton Woods we have taken practical steps toward putting this lesson into practice in the monetary and economic field.

I take it as an axiom that after this war is ended no people—and therefore no government of the people—will again tolerate prolonged and wide-spread unemployment. A revival of international trade is indispensable if full employment is to be achieved in a peaceful world and with standards of living which will permit the realization of men's reasonable hopes.

What are the fundamental conditions under which commerce among the nations can once more flourish?

First, there must be a reasonably stable standard of international exchange to which all countries can adhere without sacrificing the freedom of action necessary to meet their internal economic problems.

This is the alternative to the desperate tactics of the past—competitive currency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple currency practices, and unnecessary exchange restrictions—by which governments vainly sought to maintain employment and uphold living standards. In the final analysis, these tactics only succeeded in contributing to world-wide depression and even war. The International Fund agreed upon at Bretton Woods will help remedy this situation.

Second, long-term financial aid must be made available at reasonable rates to those countries whose industry and agriculture have been destroyed by the ruthless torch of an invader or by the heroic scorched-earth policy of their defenders.

Long-term funds must be made available also to promote sound industry and increase industrial and agricultural production in nations whose economic potentialities have not yet been developed. It is essential to us all that these nations play their full part in the exchange of goods throughout the world.

They must be enabled to produce and to sell if they are to be able to purchase and consume. The Bank for International Reconstruction and Development is designed to meet this need.

Objections to this Bank have been raised by some bankers and a few economists. The institutions proposed by the Bretton Woods Conference would indeed limit the control which certain pri-

vate bankers have in the past exercised over international finance. It would by no means restrict the investment sphere in which bankers could engage. On the contrary, it would greatly expand this sphere by enlarging the volume of international investment and would act as an enormously effective stabilizer and guarantor of loans which they might make. The chief purpose of the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development is to guarantee private loans made through the usual investment channels. It would make loans only when these could not be floated through the normal channels at reasonable rates. The effect would be to provide capital for those who need it at lower interest rates than in the past and to drive only the usurious money-lenders from the temple of international finance. For my own part I cannot look upon this outcome with any sense of dismay.

Capital, like any other commodity, should be free from monopoly control and available upon reasonable terms to those who will put it to use for the general welfare.

The delegates and technical staffs at Bretton Woods have completed their portion of the job. They sat down together, talked as friends, and perfected plans to cope with the international monetary and financial problems which all their countries face. These proposals now must be submitted to the legislatures and the peoples of the participating nations. They will pass upon what has been accomplished here.

The result will be of vital importance to everyone in every country. In the last analysis, it will

help determine whether or not people have jobs and the amount of money they are to find in their weekly pay envelopes. More important still, it concerns the kind of world in which our children are to grow to maturity. It concerns the opportunities which will await millions of young men when at last they can take off their uniforms and come home and roll up their sleeves and go to work.

This monetary agreement is but one step, of course, in the broad program of international action necessary for the shaping of a free future. But it is an indispensable step and a vital test of our intentions.

Incidentally, tonight we had a dramatic demonstration of these intentions. Tonight the Soviet Government informed me, through Mr. Stepanov, chairman of its delegation here in Bretton Woods, that it has authorized an increase in its subscription to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to \$1,200,000,000. This was done after a subscription of \$900,000,000 had been agreed upon unanimously by the Conference. By this action, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is voluntarily taking a greatly increased responsibility for the success of this Bank in the post-war world. This is an indication of the true spirit of international cooperation demonstrated throughout this Conference.

We are at a crossroads, and we must go one way or the other. The Conference at Bretton Woods has erected a signpost—a signpost pointing down a highway broad enough for all men to walk in step and side by side. If they will set out together, there is nothing on earth that need stop them.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press July 24]

The successful completion of the important work of the Bretton Woods Conference is another step toward the goal of the United Nations and nations associated with them in the war for a peaceful, secure, and happy world in which all peace-loving nations will cooperate for their mutual benefit. Once again these nations have met and discussed in a most friendly spirit problems vital to the economic security of each and every one of us. The faith expressed in my address to Congress on the Moscow Conference has never diminished. I was

therefore not surprised by the splendid cooperation of the U.S.S.R. and all the other countries in the work of the Conference and by their willingness to contribute to its success. The results of the Bretton Woods Conference are another demonstration of the fact that the nations which love peace are working together, every day and every hour, without fanfare or drums, to provide opportunities and create facilities for the attainment by all of an increasing measure of security and prosperity.

SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS,

This Conference at Bretton Woods, representing nearly all the peoples of the world, has considered matters of international money and finance which are important for peace and prosperity. The Conference has agreed on the problems needing attention, the measures which should be taken, and the forms of international cooperation or organization which are required. The agreement reached on these large and complex matters is without precedent in the history of international economic relations.

I. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Since foreign trade affects the standard of life of every people, all countries have a vital interest in the system of exchange of national currencies and the regulations and conditions which govern its working. Because these monetary transactions are international exchanges, the nations must agree on the basic rules which govern the exchanges if the system is to work smoothly. When they do not agree, and when single nations and small groups of nations attempt by special and different regulations of the foreign exchanges to gain trade advantages, the result is instability, a reduced volume of foreign trade, and damage to national economies. This course of action is likely to lead to economic warfare and to endanger the world's peace.

The Conference has therefore agreed that broad international action is necessary to maintain an international monetary system which will promote foreign trade. The nations should consult and agree on international monetary changes which affect each other. They should outlaw practices which are agreed to be harmful to world prosperity, and they should assist each other to overcome short-term exchange difficulties.

The Conference has agreed that the nations here represented should establish for these purposes a permanent international body, *The International Monetary Fund*, with powers and resources adequate to perform the tasks assigned to it. Agreement has been reached concerning these powers and resources and the additional obligations which the member countries should undertake. Draft Articles of Agreement on these points have been prepared.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

It is in the interest of all nations that post-war reconstruction should be rapid. Likewise, the development of the resources of particular regions is in the general economic interest. Programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace.

The Conference has agreed that expanded international investment is essential to provide a portion of the capital necessary for reconstruction and development.

The Conference has further agreed that the nations should cooperate to increase the volume of foreign investment for these purposes, made through normal business channels. It is especially important that the nations should cooperate to share the risks of such foreign investment, since the benefits are general.

The Conference has agreed that the nations should establish a permanent international body to perform these functions, to be called *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*. It has been agreed that the Bank should assist in providing capital through normal channels at reasonable rates of interest and for long periods for projects which will raise the productivity of the borrowing country. There is agreement that the Bank should guarantee loans made by others and that through their subscriptions of capital all countries should share with the borrowing country in guaranteeing such loans. The Conference has agreed on the powers and resources which the Bank must have and on the obligations which the member countries must assume, and has prepared draft Articles of Agreement accordingly.

The Conference has recommended that in carrying out the policies of the institutions here proposed special consideration should be given to the needs of countries which have suffered from enemy occupation and hostilities.

The proposals formulated at the Conference for the establishment of the Fund and the Bank are now submitted, in accordance with the terms of the invitation, for consideration of the governments and people of the countries represented.

¹ Annex C of the Final Act.

Special War Problems Division

By GRAHAM H. STUART¹

REPRESENTATION OF FOREIGN INTERESTS

Establishment of the Representation Section

In accordance with the so-called comity of nations or international courtesy a state may upon request make available its representational facilities to a third state, not possessing such facilities, to serve as a channel of communications and to furnish, if requested, such services as financial assistance, passport services, and protection of prisoners of war and internees. For example, the Foreign Service regulations of the United States provide that "Diplomatic and consular officers may, upon request and with the approval of the Department of State, temporarily assume the representation of foreign interests", and the United States has permitted Panama and Cuba, upon almost a semi-permanent basis, to utilize our foreign service in various places where they have no consular representation. Since 1908 this Government has also extended good offices for China in some South American countries.

Such representation may take place in times of peace, but it is upon the outbreak of war that the representational activities of a neutral state are particularly in demand. During the second World War, before December 8, 1941 when the United States became a belligerent, this country was serving as the protecting power at Berlin for Great Britain and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as well as for France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Egypt, and the Caribbean states of Panama, Haiti, and Costa Rica. In fact, after Great Britain became a belligerent, the United States took over the interests of Great Britain, not only in Germany but also in all German-occupied Europe: Bulgaria, Denmark, unoccupied France, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and in many other countries. This Government carried on that representation until it entered the war. Since the United States did not enter into a state of war with Finland, it continued to represent the British Commonwealth interests in that country until the Legation at Helsinki was closed this summer.

In peacetime such representation from the standpoint of administration was normally a function of the Division of Foreign Service Administration, but because of the vast increase of such work brought about by war conditions the representation of foreign interests was taken over by the Special Division, which had been set up in anticipation of such a situation. Representation of the interests of a belligerent government imposes a considerable amount of work both upon the State Department and upon its representatives in the other belligerent countries. The protecting power must take custodial charge of the represented government's official property, protect its nationals, and be responsible for the receipt and payment of funds provided by the represented government to its nationals for their subsistence and repatriation, when possible. Protection of prisoners of war and civilian internees subsequently became one of the most important duties of the Division.

Before the Representation Section of the Special Division was established in May 1940, the Division's Executive Section carried on all previous activities in this field. The United States had been asked, immediately upon the outbreak of the war, to assume the representation of the interests of many of the belligerent countries. For example, the United States took over the interests of France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in Germany and indicated its willingness to assume the representation of the interests of certain other governments in Europe in the event the war should spread. At the end of 1941 when the United States entered the war, the American Government was representing 18 countries and informally extending its good offices to several others. The drafting of mail and telegraphic instructions to the field offices of the Department of State, of notes to the diplomatic missions of foreign governments, and of memoranda

¹ This is the third in a series of articles on the Special War Problems Division by Dr. Stuart. For the first two articles on the Welfare Section and the Internees Section, see the BULLETIN of July 2, 1944, p. 6, and July 16, 1944, p. 63.

for the information of other divisions of the Department reached a total of over 2,500 a quarter. Many of the drafts were highly technical and complicated and required much thought and effort. The extent of the task thus assumed necessitated a steady increase in the staff of the Representation Section.

In the handling of foreign-interests funds, the Division had been receiving advances of over \$2,000,000 yearly from the governments represented. This money, which had to be strictly accounted for, was used for the payment of financial assistance to protected nationals; for the upkeep of the buildings that represented governments had used as embassies, legations, and consular offices; for the packing, storage, and shipping of the effects of the official staffs of the represented governments; and for administrative expenses in connection with representation and other functions of a similar nature.

In the present war the United States has pursued the following practice in the representation of foreign interests: (1) The United States Government will expend funds in representation of foreign interests only after deposit of funds against which to charge such expenditures; (2) in representing foreign interests the United States Government provides free the services of officers and all other personnel at Washington and the services of officers abroad. Clerical and administrative expenses abroad are charged to the government whose interests are represented.

The Division prepared estimates to support requests for funds which had to be made periodically to the governments represented. In this connection the freezing of funds by a number of countries placed an additional burden on the Division, since it increased the difficulties of supplying badly needed funds to some of the Government's missions abroad and in some instances required complicated exchange transactions involving several foreign currencies.

When the United States entered the war, it could no longer continue to represent the interests of other belligerents in enemy and enemy-occupied territory. An announcement was made on December 18, 1941 stating that the foreign interests represented by the United States missions in Berlin, Rome, Budapest, Sofia, and Bucharest and by various consulates in the Far East would be entrusted provisionally to the Government of

Switzerland.¹ Although this action lessened the representation work abroad it placed a greater burden on the Special Division of the Department, which now became the operating channel for an immense increase in the work with the protecting powers' missions in Washington representing enemy interests in the United States. Furthermore, the United States now had the difficult task of bringing back to this country hundreds of American Foreign Service officers, clerks, and miscellaneous personnel and their families from enemy territory and of returning enemy official personnel to their countries. Much additional work also had to be done through duties relating to the exchange of prisoners of war and internees.² To meet the war situation the Representation Section was now reorganized upon a somewhat different basis into four units: The Friendly Interests Unit, the Enemy Interests Unit, the Repatriation Unit, and the Administrative and Clerical Unit.

A. THE FRIENDLY INTERESTS UNIT

Since every belligerent must carry on certain relations with the enemy which are not acts of warfare but which stem from normal international relations and since the normal channels of communication are closed to belligerents in times of war, neutral powers are utilized to carry on during the war these limited but necessary peacetime functions. In the second World War the number of neutrals is exceedingly limited, and, as a result, the function of protection of the interests of belligerents in the territory of opposing belligerents has become a real burden. This is particularly true of Switzerland, which currently is representing the interests of 48 belligerents, and in some instances, as in the case of its representation of the interests of the United States, that representation is carried on in 28 different enemy or enemy-occupied states.

International law is exceedingly sketchy in this field of representation; and therefore it is not strange that the pre-war Foreign Service regulations of the United States, based as they were on the comparatively limited experience gained during former wars confined to small areas instead of the global surface, are entirely inadequate to meet the existing situation. As a result, one of the duties of the Friendly Interests Unit is to pre-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1941, p. 541.

² BULLETIN of July 16, 1944, p. 63.

pare a complete revision of these regulations to accord more nearly with present conditions and to be based upon the numerous precedents and procedures which date from the second World War.

The Foreign Service regulations contain no information regarding the initiation and coordination of policy and action in matters pertaining to the representation by a third power of the interests of the United States in enemy countries. Since diplomatic relations are essentially a procedure of peace the failure of the regulations to cover this subject adequately is understandable. Nevertheless, wars do break out and the United States continues, from time to time, to participate in them. The problem of representation therefore must be faced, and it is the responsibility of the Friendly Interests Unit to deal with it. With no guiding precedents on which to base procedure it must be developed as cases arise; and since most of the cases are of an urgent nature the right decisions must be arrived at quickly.

The represented government, although it cannot specifically instruct the agent of the representing government, nevertheless may indicate its wishes in any given matter for the guidance of the agent. For example, when the German Government required the Swiss Government to close its consulates at Amsterdam and Salonika, the United States sent a strong protest to the German Government, through the Swiss Government, on the ground that such action materially interfered with the effectiveness of Swiss representation of American interests in the areas concerned. Since Switzerland was also protecting German interests in the United States, it was made evident that unless Germany permitted a fair representation of American interests in Germany the United States would have to reconsider its existing policy of imposing no restrictions upon the representation by the Swiss Government of German interests in the United States.

Other instances of German restrictions which the Friendly Interests Unit had to consider and attempt to remedy were the following: The limitation that Germany imposed on the Swiss consular staff at Paris; the involuntary delay by the Swiss consul in assuming the representation of American interests in Tunis, which was attributable to the German military authorities; the involuntary transfer of Swiss consulates from Marseilles and Nice to Montelimar and Grenoble upon German

orders (in which case it was found, however, that the effectiveness of Swiss representation was not impaired sufficiently to warrant protest); and restrictions imposed by the German authorities upon the quantity of gasoline permitted to representatives of the protecting power, which circumscribed their effectiveness in protecting United States interests by throttling its motor transportation at a time when the occupation immobilized public transportation facilities.

The Japanese Government likewise imposed unwarranted restrictions upon the Swiss representatives who had undertaken the protection of the interests of the United States in the occupied regions of the Far East. For example, the Swiss consulate at Hong Kong was arbitrarily closed by orders of the Japanese authorities; the Swiss representatives were all but prevented from making allowances of American Government funds to American nationals; and the Japanese imposed restrictions upon visits by Swiss authorities to places in Japanese-occupied areas where American nationals were detained, and in some places they permitted no visits at all.

Protection of property

One of the fundamental rights of a belligerent is that his diplomatic and consular properties and archives remain inviolate and that they be given adequate protection by the enemy government. It is the duty of the protecting power to see that this right is respected. In accordance with normal procedure the seal of the protecting power is placed upon such properties. Although consular properties do not possess so definite a claim to immunity as do diplomatic properties, the United States, on its part, places them in the same category and accords them full protection. Several flagrant violations of international law and usage in this field have been perpetrated both by the Germans and the Japanese. German officials entered the former American Embassy at Vichy, before the Swiss representative was able to place it under his protection, and removed certain archives and certain personal property belonging to officials of the Embassy. Later, on March 21, 1943, the German police entered the quarters at Baden-Baden of the former American Assistant Naval Attaché at Vichy, searched him and the quarters, removed certain documents from his briefcase, and kept him in solitary confinement for three and one-half days. The Friendly Interests Unit prepared and

sent protests to Bern to be presented to the German Government.

In the case of consular archives the Italians at Monaco refused to allow the Swiss consul at Nice to assume charge of the archives of the American consulate before the archives had been subjected to a minute examination by the Italian secret police. In Tunis both the American and British consular offices and residences were completely sacked and made uninhabitable. Safes were broken open and none of the archives remained. Consul General Doolittle's household goods and even clothing belonging to his family completely disappeared. Examples of failure of the Japanese Government to respect our diplomatic and consular properties in Japanese-occupied territories are even more flagrant, although treatment of corresponding property in Japan proper has apparently been correct.

A somewhat different problem has arisen in determining whether official protection can be extended to American semi-private property, such as the American Academy and St. Paul's Church in Rome. The criteria determining the American policy regarding such institutions are as follows: The property must not be utilized for profit; it must be devoted to public or semi-public use; and the protecting power must be permitted by the enemy government to protect the property as though it were official property of the United States Government. In these circumstances the State Department is disposed to permit such semi-public institutions to be given a measure of protection and to permit remittance of funds to enemy territory to meet minimum maintenance charges. The basic problem here is the decision of the Treasury Department not to license remittances of funds necessary to conserve such property in enemy territory against loss through war-conditioned legal process or confiscation for failure to meet fiscal or other obligations.

In the case of strictly private property, the Department has not been in a position to act other than to suggest that all available information be furnished to the Department so that every possible assistance might be given to the American owners of such properties as soon as such assistance might become practicable. Furthermore, the Swiss have been asked to do what they can toward conservation, short of paying charges on private property.

However, in conjunction with other United Nations, the United States issued on January 4, 1943 a warning of its intention to do all in its power to nullify the methods of dispossession practiced by the enemy governments and to hold them responsible for restitution and indemnification.¹

Private transfer of funds to enemy territory, whether used for maintenance of citizens or their properties, is not permitted. The Department sees no objection, however, to private sale of perishable property in the case of estates or to payment of local obligations due by the decedent when funds are available for the purpose. In general, the authorization given to the Swiss representatives is approximately the same as granted to officers of the Foreign Service in similar matters.

Transmission of private messages and documents

As a fundamental means of self-protection, the United States curtails by any means whatsoever communications between private persons in the United States and those in enemy territory. The restriction includes private correspondence by open or diplomatic mail, telegraph, telephone, and radio—every sort of document, even birth, marriage, and death certificates.

Upon purely humanitarian grounds, however, certain exceptions are allowed with respect to messages, and it is the function of the Friendly Interests Unit to inform the protecting power and all American diplomatic and consular officers and diplomatic missions in the United States of these regulations. For example, subject to censorship, brief personal messages, such as welfare and whereabouts inquiries, may be sent to or from enemy territories by mail or telegraph through specially licensed channels, such as the Red Cross and the Vatican, or if it is impossible to use those channels and if the inquiries are sufficiently important, they may be sent through official channels. In the latter case the messages must be in behalf of nationals of or nationals protected by the country serving as channel of communication.

The Unit must make sure that the representatives of the power protecting the interests of the United States in enemy territory forward information to the United States essential to its records in connection with the protection of its nationals. Such information includes notices of births, deaths, marriages, and divorces of its nationals.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1943, p. 21.

In addition, the United States has asked the protecting power to furnish, when possible, information concerning the status of private American property, real and personal, commercial and financial, in enemy territory. Information regarding semi-public American institutions of an educational, religious, or philanthropic character is also solicited.

It is a function of the Unit to see that these restrictions are not construed so that they limit in any way the transmission of documents, letters, postal cards, and telegrams by prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, which has also been extended, so far as it is adaptable, to civilian internees.

Representation by the United States of foreign interests

The Friendly Interests Unit is also responsible for the representation by the United States of the interests of numerous foreign powers in countries where the represented powers have no diplomatic or consular representation. Our entrance into the war as a belligerent necessarily reduced the number of countries represented, but on January 1, 1944 the United States was still representing a dozen different countries in various parts of the world as well as performing, when requested, consular functions for several others and extending its good offices for China, Colombia, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in various countries.¹

In the representation of foreign interests during the present conflict the United States has been faced with certain problems never before encountered. As a result of our maintaining the so-called Hoover-Stimson policy of non-recognition of the acquisition of territory by force, this Government has refused to be represented in or to permit the representation of the interests of any country, such as Slovakia, which was established in violation of that principle.

In the performance of the actual functions of representation the work is primarily carried on by the Foreign Service personnel which has charge of such representation. The Representation Section must supervise such representation with great care, must draft instructions, diplomatic notes, and letters, and must serve as the channel of communication with represented governments.

Miscellaneous duties

The Friendly Interests Unit performs miscellaneous duties, such as maintaining a channel of communication between certain of the American republics which have no diplomatic representation in Switzerland and the Swiss Government, which is in charge of the interests of those countries in enemy areas; making arrangements to give financial assistance to American seamen who are not American citizens but who are detained by the enemy; defining the eligibility of certain persons, particularly alien wives and dependents of American citizens in the Far East, to receive financial assistance from the funds of the United States Government; establishing policy concerning the collection of consular fees for represented governments; drafting instructions governing the performance of passport, visa, notarial, invoice, and shipping services on behalf of represented governments; and establishing standards of treatment for personnel employed abroad in connection with the representation by the United States of foreign interests.

The Unit, basing its position upon the final act of the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control, held in Washington in 1942,² is responsible for preparing and dispatching communications to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva and instructions to the American diplomatic officers in the other American republics covering restrictions applicable to the transmission of funds from enemy territory to the Western Hemisphere, and from the Western Hemisphere to enemy territory through the facilities of the International Red Cross.

B. THE ENEMY INTERESTS UNIT

Those powers which are at war with the United States are represented at Washington by certain neutral powers, namely, Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain. It is the duty of the Enemy Interests Unit to initiate and coordinate such policy and action as are required in the supervision of such representation. Furthermore, these policies should correspond, as far as possible, to those followed in the territories of the other United Nations and in areas that our armed forces occupy.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1944, p. 265.

² BULLETIN of July 4, 1942, p. 581.

International law very specifically provides that foreign diplomatic representatives of enemy states shall be given full protection and shall be permitted to return home at the earliest possible time. The law regarding consular establishments is less specific, but modern states have generally given consuls approximately the same considerations in regard to protection as diplomats receive. In both cases the protecting power must see that proper treatment is accorded. The Enemy Interests Unit of the Representation Section was made responsible for negotiations relating to the proper treatment of Axis representatives that the State Department carried on with the protecting power. This included the securing of proper housing in the United States for the enemy diplomatic representatives and consuls in case of detention and the arranging for their early repatriation.

The United States Government was correctly liberal toward the German diplomatic staff—all the members of the Embassy staff were allowed to remain in their private houses until they could liquidate their personal affairs and pack their belongings. They were permitted free and continuous access to the representatives of the Swiss Legation, which had assumed representation of German interests. They were given continuous police protection, both in the Embassy and in going back and forth to their homes. When this Government decided that the Axis representatives should be segregated it made efforts immediately to find adequate hotel accommodations in the proper environment for the entire staff commensurate with their former official station. Similar correct treatment was accorded the representatives of the other Axis powers, Italy, Japan, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

The staffs of the German Embassy and of the Hungarian Legation and Consulates were housed at the Greenbrier Hotel at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Arrangements were made for them to communicate by direct wire with the Swiss and Swedish Legations, which were their respective protecting powers. Similar arrangements were made for the Japanese diplomatic and consular staffs at the Homestead Hotel, Hot Springs, Virginia.

About the middle of January 1942, at the request of the Attorney General, the Italian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Missions were, for security reasons, also assembled at White Sulphur Springs. The

State Department had, up until that time, accorded these diplomats the privilege of remaining in their homes, since American diplomats were given the same courtesy in their capitals.

At the hotels in the United States where the enemy representatives were detained, some perplexing problems arose. The Federal Bureau of Investigation thought all arms in possession of members of the official groups should be removed. Since international law forbids search of diplomatic persons or premises, the State Department opposed any attempt at forcible action. The Secretary of State, as a compromise, asked the representatives of the protecting powers to request the members of the diplomatic and consular corps to turn over voluntarily to the Department's representative at the hotel all firearms in their possession. The Department returned such articles at the time of the general exchange of American, German, Italian, and Bulgarian nationals.

The United States Government assumed all expenses attached to such detention, and the Special Division assisted in the arrangements. Within the Division all arrangements for repatriation were assigned to the Representation Section, which distributed the task between the Repatriation Unit and the Enemy Interests Unit. The latter had charge particularly of negotiating with the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments through the protecting powers concerning conditions of the exchange, such as vessels to be used, safe-conducts to be obtained, and the amount of funds and baggage to be taken by the exchanged personnel.

Some idea of the problems may be understood when one considers that at the town of Lourenço Marques, where the exchange with Japan was to occur, thousands of persons arrived without funds and exchange facilities had to be provided to furnish the American repatriates with local and dollar currency both for their expenses at the port awaiting embarkation and in the vessel proceeding to the United States.

The following arrangements for funds were made: The State Department, under a Treasury license, made provision for the American consul at Lourenço Marques to advance to nationals of the United States and the other American republics escudos against promissory notes and to receive in return unused escudos when the party sailed. An officer was sent on the exchange vessel from New York to Lourenço Marques to advance dollar cur-

rency under such Treasury license to passengers against promissory notes. He had \$100,000 in currency which was sufficient to advance about \$50 to \$100 to each passenger. That amount would cover the needs of the passengers while they were on the vessel.

Temporary provision for food and shelter was necessary, as well as quarters for the personnel to handle the work of carrying out the exchange. The Representation Section had to solve these problems through correspondence with the American consul at Lourenço Marques.

Restrictions imposed upon baggage and funds

All aliens exchanged were permitted to take with them a certain amount of their personal property, including money. In the first two exchanges at Lisbon, Portugal, on the *Drottningholm* in 1942 all German nationals were permitted to take with them an amount not exceeding \$300 for each adult. On the third exchange German repatriates having an official character could take out \$300, but, since Germany had not reciprocated our liberal provision, non-officials were restricted to \$60.¹ The departing aliens could also take personal effects, including jewelry, clothing, and household goods, except furniture. Inclusion of such articles as cameras, radios, typewriters, and firearms was not permitted. The Enemy Interests Unit carried on the negotiations with the Foreign Funds Control and the Bureau of Customs to make the necessary arrangements.

Several interesting incidents arose in connection with the recent repatriation of the representatives of the Vichy-French Government. The French Ambassador to Japan had sent to Ambassador Henry-Haye six cases of vitamins for his personal use. The boxes had arrived in New York in July 1941, but the French Ambassador had not claimed them before his departure early in 1944. As a result, the question arose whether these cases could be properly claimed as personal property. When the French Ambassador declared that the vitamins were his personal property and agreed to distribute them under his own personal supervision to the children of France, permission to include them in his personal luggage was granted.

In 1942, in the case of non-official persons who were being repatriated, a careful search was made of their persons and baggage at New York, but later in 1943 and 1944 the complete customs examination took place before departure from the in-

ternment camps. Strip-search was waived except in unusual cases.² The non-official persons were permitted to take no papers or documents except passports and birth certificates, which were needed for identification.

Loss of baggage in the exchange of nationals is likely to occur, and the Unit has upon numerous occasions made exhaustive efforts to find lost articles and turn them over to the protecting power.

Safe-conducts

In order to travel in times of war, in addition to the normal papers such as passports or certificates of identity, one must have a safe-conduct issued by the belligerent Government through whose blockade, or, less often, territory, a national of an opposing belligerent will pass. As prescribed by the United States Government the safe-conduct is a document giving the name, nationality, age, and occupation of the person, authorizing him to travel without molestation on a designated vessel sailing on a certain date from a port which is named and bound for a declared destination. If ports of call are made they must be noted. Such safe-conducts when authorized by the Department are issued by American diplomatic and consular officers, rarely by the Department.

The Enemy Interests Unit is charged with all negotiations pertaining to the granting of safe-conducts for the travel of all enemy belligerents. It determines whether those who are returning to the countries of which they are nationals are acceptable for repatriation. The greater number of these requests have come from persons in South America who are proceeding to Europe.

A unique case of safe-conduct, which seems to have established a precedent, was the issuance in September 1943 on the part of the United States of a documentary safe-conduct for the Swedish motor vessel *Gripsholm*, which was being employed on the voyage from New York to Mormugão and return to exchange nationals of the United States and certain Latin American republics for nationals of Japan. Before it issued this document the State Department obtained assurances of safe-conduct from all the United Nations and,

¹ This was the amount permitted to American repatriates from Germany.

² Individuals repatriated to Europe in 1942 were subjected to strip-search.

through Switzerland, obtained assurances of safe-conduct from the Japanese Government for itself and for all its co-belligerents. Although numerous exchange vessels, Red Cross vessels, and others had previously traveled under assurances of safe-conduct from all belligerents, no comparable document, so far as is known, had ever been issued reducing the assurances to certificate form. The inauguration of this practice, which is important historically, is therefore attributable to the initiative and foresight of the Special War Problems Division.

The Enemy Interests Unit in connection with these exchanges of belligerent nationals for Americans has various other duties to perform. In order to facilitate the mechanical operation of the exchange, involving the discharge and taking on board in a single day of hundreds of passengers, the Swiss representatives with the aid of designated repatriates were requested to prepare information which would be helpful in the berthing of officials on the exchange vessel. A complete alphabetical list, in 20 copies, of all persons reaching the exchange port is required as well as an alphabetical list of those persons who should have preferential berthing because of age, physical condition, or of the fact that they are accompanied by small children.

But before the exchange groups can be embarked, weeks of work are necessary after conclusion of the exchange agreement to find and assemble at railheads throughout the continental United States the hundreds of individuals to be included. Transportation schedules must be carefully planned so that on the day of sailing railway cars will reach the dockside at regular 45-minute intervals, the time required to process each group for embarkation. In this work the Special War Problems Division is ably assisted by the officials of the Chief Special Agent's staff, the Coast Guard, and officers of the Security Agencies. To make sure that the entire operation at the dock proceeds not only with dispatch but also in a measure which will not give rise to any legitimate complaints from the enemy nationals being embarked or from their Government, the Division

makes a complete pictorial record, including both still and motion pictures, of the operation. This record is kept in the Division's confidential file for use to refute any claims of mismanagement or ill-treatment that the enemy government may subsequently make. In addition, a 30-minute interval running report of the progress of the operation is telephoned by direct line from the pier to the Division from the moment the first group of exchangees arrives at the pier until the exchange vessel's whistle blows announcing the departure of the boat from the United States to the exchange port.

Hospital ships

By the terms of the tenth convention of the Hague Conference of 1907, the principles of the Geneva convention concerning the rules of land warfare were adapted to maritime warfare, and all hospital ships were given protection against attack or seizure. The convention, although it is being observed, is not legally in force in the present conflict because all of the belligerents have not adhered to it. A duty of the Enemy Interests Unit is to give notification of enemy hospital ships to the military authorities of the United States, and of United States hospital ships to enemy governments through the Swiss Government in accordance with the spirit of the pertinent international conventions. It also coordinates replies to enemy governments' complaints regarding alleged attacks upon enemy hospital ships by units of the United States armed forces, or on United States hospital ships by units of the enemy armed forces. Hospital ships have special markings and are illuminated¹ at night, but in airplanes from high altitudes or in foggy weather it is sometimes difficult to distinguish such markings. For that reason efforts are sometimes made to give notification of the presence of hospital ships in certain areas so that belligerents may take every precaution to respect them.

The United States Government has made every effort to comply with the principles of the Hague convention concerning the immunity of hospital ships and has investigated all protests made by the enemy through the protecting powers. Switzerland presented numerous complaints in behalf of the Italian Government. In every case a careful investigation followed and appropriate action was taken. In the case of an alleged attack upon

¹ Blackout equipment may be carried and utilized in convoys according to a unilateral interpretation by the United States Government. The Hospital Ship Convention, which is generally observed, provides that hospital ships proceeding without illumination at night do so at their own risk.

the Italian hospital ship *Aquileia* on April 26, 1943, it was found that no American aircraft were operating in the vessel's vicinity. In the case of the *Toscana*, attacks by American craft ceased as soon as the markings were observed. No hits were made, but the United States Government offered apologies.

On several occasions the United States associated itself with the British Government in protesting attacks upon British hospital ships by German and Italian planes in the Mediterranean area. A German dive bomber sank the hospital ship *Talamba* although it was clearly marked and was engaged at the time in embarking casualties. On other occasions the United States and Great Britain discussed their respective attitude regarding Japanese hospital ships which were not clearly marked or had not been officially notified to this Government or which had assumed the risks of being anchored or proceeding in close proximity to enemy war vessels.

Another policy which received consideration in the Department, but approval of which was not considered advisable, was the utilization of hospital ships to transport internees or repatriates under a safe-conduct. A careful consideration of these and similar problems was a part of the work that the officers of the Enemy Interests Unit of the Special Division transacted.

At the present time the United States has in commission some twenty hospital ships.¹ Considerable work is required, after receipt of all necessary information from the War and Navy Departments, in notifying enemy governments of the names and characteristics of their hospital vessels and in obtaining acknowledgments. Follow-up work is often necessary because, although not provided for in the convention, it is desirable for the safety of these vessels that acknowledgments be obtained before the vessels are cleared for humanitarian duties.

Control of funds

It is not the policy of the United States to permit the use of existing blocked funds of enemy governments in this country for expenditure on behalf of such enemy governments in the United States. Nevertheless, since the protecting powers must have money to carry on their functions, the United States has been willing to agree to an arrangement by which the protecting powers may

obtain funds for the representation of the interested enemy governments in the United States. Under Executive Order 8389, as amended, the protecting power may engage in financial transactions on behalf of enemy governments or their nationals pursuant only to license. Licenses have been issued authorizing the protecting powers to open and operate bank accounts.

The United States has been willing to agree to an arrangement by which the interested enemy governments will pay Swiss francs to the Swiss Foreign Office, which, in turn, will deposit such funds to the credit of the Special Swiss Franc Account which the American Legation at Bern maintains with the Swiss National Bank. Upon receipt of telegraphic advice that such funds have been deposited, the State Department will make available to the protecting power concerned, for deposit in the appropriate bank account in the United States, the counter value in dollars to be used in the representation of the interests in the United States of the respective country.

The United States has on numerous occasions remitted funds to Switzerland, which are deposited in the Special Swiss Franc Account with the Swiss National Bank in favor of the American Legation in Bern. From this account Swiss francs are supplied to the Swiss Government for purchasing other currencies necessary to represent the interests of the United States in third countries.

Many problems have arisen pertaining to the distribution of funds to enemy aliens detained in the United States. All funds belonging to enemy aliens are blocked; therefore this Government must resort to an exceptional procedure. For example, the Treasury Department has issued licenses to the representatives of the various protecting powers authorizing them to receive funds remitted from the other American republics and Canada for the benefit of aliens interned in the United States or Jamaica and to pay their funds to the officers in charge of the camp where the alien is interned. Such funds promote good morale and facilitate camp administration. The Friendly Interests Unit, on its own initiative, negotiates the issuance of the licenses permitting these remittances, in an effort to meet an evident need and terminate hopeless confusion.

¹ This is about the same as the number possessed by the Axis powers: Germany, 24; Japan, 21. When Italy was ranged with the Axis, it possessed 22 hospital ships.

The Enemy Interests Unit carried on long negotiations with the Treasury Department and with the Japanese Government regarding funds to be taken by Japanese and American exchanged nationals. It finally made an arrangement that permitted each adult evacuee to take with him or her 1,000 yen, or \$300, for use on board ship until arrival at the place of exchange. Amounts of money unused were to be returned by the representative of the protecting power and used for representation purposes in the country from which the evacuee came. Numerous individual cases of transfer of funds, in instances where funds arrived at the last moment, to Japanese and Germans embarking on the exchange vessels were checked at the pier by Mrs. Hawley of the Enemy Interests Unit to see that the \$300 limit was maintained. In the case of 60 Japanese coming from Santiago, Chile, to embark on the vessel at Rio de Janeiro, Mr. Castle of the Unit arranged with the Treasury Department to have the Federal Reserve Bank of New York authorize the Santiago Branch of the National City Bank of New York to sell traveler's checks up to but not exceeding the amount of \$300 a person, provided the total amount sold did not exceed \$18,000. In the event that the bank had insufficient traveler's checks it was authorized to issue the balance in drafts. Each such draft and traveler's check was marked to the effect that it was payable only on board the M.S. *Gripsholm*.

An interesting situation in funds control arose over the annual sum of the proceeds of sales of fur-seal skins from the Pribiloff Islands that the Government of the United States paid to Japan in accordance with the North Pacific Sealing Convention of July 7, 1911. The sums sent annually to Japan varied from approximately \$10,000 to \$40,000. When the act of October 9, 1940 froze such disbursements the funds were held to the credit of Japan. In October 1940 Japan gave notice of termination of the treaty which, therefore, was abrogated as from October 1941. The United States was under obligation to pay the final installment of \$33,552.97 to the Japanese Government. It thought first of depositing this amount, minus certain sums due the United States, to the credit of Japan and notifying the Spanish Ambassador in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States, but it finally decided merely to earmark the amount for payment to Japan and to make disposition of the funds following the close of the war.

Miscellaneous

One of the problems which required a considerable amount of attention and correspondence on the part of the Unit was the action to be taken regarding a collection of French paintings which had been on exhibit in Argentina and had then been sent to the United States. That collection, entitled "From David to the Present Day", included eight paintings lent by owners for a tour at the request of the French Ambassador to Argentina, with the understanding that they were to be returned within a few months. When the United States froze French assets the whole exhibit came under the control of the United States Government. The owners of the paintings on March 12, 1941 made applications for the return of the eight paintings, but the applications were rejected upon the basis of the information given. When Vichy broke relations with the United States, the question arose whether the United States should block these exhibits as articles of value blocked with other French funds and property or whether they might be excepted and returned to France with the members of the Embassy staff. A third possibility was to place the exhibit in the custody of the Swiss Legation as protecting power. The situation was complicated by the fact that the eight paintings added to the collection at the request of the French Ambassador to Argentina were privately owned by various individuals or collectors in Argentina and the United States. The Argentine Ambassador at Washington intervened personally to secure the return of one of these eight paintings which belonged to a citizen of Argentina. In this particular case the Treasury Department was willing to grant license upon proof of ownership for the return of this painting to its Argentine claimant.

Another aspect of the situation was raised when M. Batigne, previously curator of painting and later curator of French paintings at the National Gallery of Art and a member of the French Military Mission, requested that he be authorized to exhibit the collection known as "From David to the Present Day" as well as other paintings lent by the French Government and at present on exhibit in various museums or stored in New York.

The Enemy Interests Unit of the Special Division suggested that the United States Government, through the National Gallery, might act for the duration of the war as trustee for all French works of art and retain M. Batigne as curator.

This proposal was submitted to the trustees of the National Gallery with the assurance that the Foreign Funds Control of the Treasury Department would be disposed to issue the necessary authorization placing these various works of art in the custody of the National Gallery and that provision would be made for sufficient funds to defray the storage, maintenance, and insurance charges. The proposal was eventually broadened to cover the various French exhibition articles, including works of art, sent to the United States. Foreign Funds Control agreed, and the Treasury Department on March 13, 1944 issued a license to that effect.

A survey of the Repatriation Unit of the Representation Section will appear in the next issue of the BULLETIN.

Luxembourg Civil-Affairs Agreement

[Released to the press July 27]

Agreements in indetical terms have been concluded by the United Kingdom and the United States of America with the Government of Luxembourg concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdiction in Luxembourg territory when it is liberated by the Allied expeditionary force under the Supreme Allied Commander.

These agreements, which are on the same model as the agreements concluded by the United Kingdom and the United States of America with the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, are intended to be essentially temporary and practical in character.¹ They are designed to facilitate the task of the Supreme Allied Commander and to further the common purpose of the Governments concerned, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Allied territory and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.

The agreements recognize that the Supreme Allied Commander must enjoy *de facto* during the first or military phase of the liberation of Luxembourg such measure of supreme responsibility and authority over civil administration as may be required by the military situation. It is laid down

that, as soon as the military situation permits, the Luxembourg Government shall resume their full constitutional responsibility for civil administration on the understanding that such special facilities as the Allied forces may continue to require on Luxembourg territory will be made available for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

The Soviet Government have been consulted regarding these arrangements and have expressed their agreement.

Mission for Restoration of Trade to Commercial Channels

[Released to the press July 26]

Under the sponsorship of the Department of State a special group comprising Government officials and representative businessmen temporarily in the Government service for the purpose will conduct a survey in North Africa and possibly in other areas to investigate the possibility of restoring trade to normal commercial channels. For this purpose the Foreign Economic Administration has secured the services temporarily of four outstanding representatives of firms with long foreign-trade experience. To this group will be added representatives of the Departments of State and Commerce, the Foreign Economic Administration, and perhaps the Bureau of the Budget.

At the request of the Secretary of State, the War Department has made available the services of the Honorable William S. Culbertson, Lt. Col., G.S.C., to serve as the chairman of the mission. Colonel Culbertson is now serving as Assistant to the Commandant of the Army Industrial College. He is an authority on trade and finance and has had wide public experience in the United States Tariff Commission and the diplomatic service, having served as Minister to Rumania and Ambassador to Chile.

The specific objectives of the mission are to review on the ground the problems involved in returning trade to normal channels as rapidly as wartime conditions permit and to recommend procedures which would insure the fullest possible participation of private business in such Government transactions as may be required in view of wartime exigencies.

¹ BULLETIN of May 20, 1944, p. 479.

Concurrent Resolution of Congress on the Establishment of the Republic of Iceland

[Released to the press July 26]

The Secretary of State delivered on the afternoon of July 26 to the Honorable Thor Thors, Minister of Iceland, an enrolled copy of the Concurrent Resolution recently adopted by unanimous vote of the Congress congratulating the Icelandic Althing on the establishment of the Republic of Iceland.¹

The text of the resolution is given below:

"WHEREAS the people of Iceland in a free plebiscite on May 20 to 23, 1944, overwhelmingly approved the constitutional bill passed by the Althing providing for the establishment of a republican form of government; and

"WHEREAS the Republic of Iceland will be formally established on June 17, 1944: Now, therefore, be it

"RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES (THE SENATE CONCURRING): That the Congress hereby expresses to the Icelandic Althing, the oldest parliamentary body in the world, its congratulations on the establishment of the Republic of Iceland and its welcome to the Republic of Iceland as the newest republic in the family of free nations."

The appreciation of the Althing for this action by the Congress was conveyed to the American Legation at Reykjavik through the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a note dated June 22, 1944, the text of which follows:

"The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Legation of the United States of America and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Legation's note dated June 16, 1944 in which the Ministry is informed of a resolution passed unanimously by the Senate and the House of Representatives concurring in which the Congress of the United States expresses to the Althing its congratulations on the establishment of the Republic of Iceland and its welcome to Iceland as the newest Republic in the family of free nations.

"This very friendly greeting, for which the Icelandic Government wishes to express its deepest appreciation, was immediately forwarded by the Ministry to the President of the United Althing and at the first meeting of the Althing thereafter the President read the greeting to the United Althing.

"Thereupon the President of the Althing stated, that the supreme authorities of the United States of America, the President and the Government, had been the first Power (being one of the greatest nations in the world) to promise in advance their recognition, should the independence of Iceland be fully solved in this year. Secondly he stated that this Power had been the first in sending a special representative of the highest standing from the President and the Government of the United States to be present and bring their felicitations on the great day of Iceland at the inauguration of the Constitution of the Republic on June 17, 1944. In addition to this, he said, the Althing now receives furthermore the greetings, felicitations, and blessings from the sister parliament of the Althing, the United States Congress, and that this would be a great source of joy to everybody, which the people of Iceland would most certainly remember, as well as the whole attitude of this great Power in every respect during the period that Iceland had had closer dealings with the United States than with any other country.

"The President of the Althing then concluded his speech with the following words: 'I shall in the name of the Althing take the liberty to bring in an appropriate manner the greetings of the Althing to the Congress of the United States and its wishes of wellbeing and especial thanks. Those members who support this will rise from their seats'.

"Whereupon the members rose from their seats.

"The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would appreciate if the Legation would kindly have the aforesaid greeting of the Althing forwarded to the United States Congress.

"MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
"Reykjavik, June 22, 1944."

¹ BULLETIN of June 17, 1944, p. 537.

TREATY INFORMATION

Agreement With Canada Regarding Certain Defense Installations

The following notes were exchanged by the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State:

No. 238 WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 23, 1944.*
SIR,

I have the honour to refer to the exchange of notes between the Governments of Canada and the United States dated January 27, 1943, regarding the post-war disposition of defence projects and installations constructed in Canada by the Government of the United States.¹ These notes approved the 28th Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which said in part:

"The Board considered the question of the post-war disposition of the defence projects and installations which the Government of the United States has built or may build in Canada. The Board noted that the two Governments have already reached specific agreements for the post-war disposition of most of the projects and installations thus far undertaken. It considers that such agreements are desirable and should be made whenever possible.

"The Board recommends the approval of the following formula as a generally fair and equitable basis to be used by reference whenever appropriate in the making of agreements in the future and to cover such defence projects, if any, the post-war disposition of which has not previously been specifically provided for:

"A: All immovable defence installations built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, be relinquished to the Crown either in the right of Canada or in the right of the province in which the same or any part thereof lies, as may be appropriate under Canadian law."

2. As hereinafter explained, the two governments have agreed that special arrangements should be made relating to permanent United States air installations in Canada and to the telephone line from Edmonton to the Alaska boundary built by the United States Government.

3. In note no. 643 of December 18, 1943, I informed you that the Canadian Government "will not accept payment from the United States Government for the construction of any permanent facilities or improvements made by the Canadian Government on United States Government account on airfields in Northwest Canada, and will make payment to the United States Government for all construction of a permanent nature carried out by the United States Government on air routes in this area."

4. It was subsequently agreed between the two Governments that, in addition, the Canadian Government should assume the cost of permanent air installations elsewhere in Canada and at Goose Bay (Labrador) built by or on the account of the United States Government, the cost of the telephone line from Edmonton to the Alaska boundary built by the United States Government, and the cost of the proposed improvement program on the Northwest Staging Route.

5. Discussions have recently taken place between representatives of the two Governments regarding the details of the decisions and arrangements referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, with a view to listing the installations involved and their costs, and to settling the exact amount of money to be paid by the Canadian Government to the United States Government.

6. It is my understanding that the following has been agreed as a result of these discussions. The Canadian Government will pay to the United States Government the following amounts in United States dollars for construction carried out by the United States Government:

Northwest Staging Route (Including contracts not yet completed)	\$31,311,196
Flight strips along the Alaska Highway	3,262,687
Flight strips along the Mackenzie River	1,264,150
Hudson Bay Air Route	27,460,330
Airfield at Mingan, P. Q.	3,627,980
Airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador	543,000
Telephone line from Edmonton to Alaska boundary	9,342,208

TOTAL 76,811,551

¹ Executive Agreement Series 391.

7. The details of the costs of construction are shown in the attached appendices¹ marked "I", "II" and "III", which have been prepared by the United States War Department. The appendices show that costs of \$90,683,571 were actually incurred by the United States Government in construction but \$13,872,020 of this amount was for installations which, although of value to joint defence during the war, have no permanent value. It has been agreed that the Canadian Government should pay that part of United States construction costs which represents installations having a permanent value, namely \$76,811,551.

8. The costs incurred by the Canadian Government on United States Government account which the Canadian Government will assume pursuant to the decisions reached are as follows:

Northwest Staging Route	\$18,359,953
Northeast Canada	1,290,010
Airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador	9,950,000
TOTAL	\$29,599,963

In addition the Canadian Government will pay \$5,161,000 for the projected improvement program on the Northwest Staging Route. Details of the four items mentioned in this paragraph are given in the attached appendix marked "IV".

9. It is understood that all the items mentioned in the four appendices, whether or not of permanent value, will be relinquished to the Canadian Government pursuant to the Exchange of Notes of January 27, 1943, hereinbefore referred to. However, such relinquishment does not affect existing arrangements for the maintenance, operation and defence of these facilities for the duration of the war. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the following extract from the Journal of the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held April 12-13, 1944:

"In noting this decision of the two Governments, (i. e. the decision of the Canadian Government to assume the costs of the installations), the Board observed that it relates only to the financial aspect of the facilities in question and has no bearing on existing arrangements for the maintenance,

¹ Not printed.

operation and defence of the facilities for the duration of the war. It is the Board's understanding that the existing arrangements will remain in effect for the duration of the emergency as previously agreed upon unless modified by mutual agreement between the two Governments."

10. If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of the United States, this note and your reply thereto shall be regarded as placing on record the understanding arrived at between our Governments.

Accept [etc.]

LEIGHTON MCCARTHY

JUNE 27, 1944.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to refer to your note of June 23, 1944 in regard to a decision of the Canadian Government to reimburse the United States Government for the expenditures on certain defense installations in Canada and at Goose Bay (Labrador). The proposals set forth in Your Excellency's note are acceptable to the Government of the United States. It is agreed that your note and this reply thereto shall be regarded as placing on record the understanding arrived at between our Governments.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, Jr.

Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic

Panama

The Director General of the Pan American Union, by a letter of July 21, 1944, informed the Secretary of State that on July 13, 1944 His Excellency the Ambassador of Panama in the United States, Señor Don Enrique A. Jiménez, signed, in the name of his Government, the Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic, which was deposited with the Pan American Union and opened for signature on December 15, 1943.

Protocol on Pelagic Whaling

The American Embassy in London transmitted to the Department of State the following information received from the British Foreign Office regarding deposits of instruments of ratification of and notification of accession to the protocol relating to pelagic whaling operations, signed at London on February 7, 1944:

Ratifications:

United States—instrument of ratification deposited in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom on July 10, 1944

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—instrument of ratification deposited in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom on June 28, 1944

Accession:

Mexico—notification of accession placed on record in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom on June 29, 1944

The Norwegian instrument of ratification of the protocol was deposited on March 31, 1944 (see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1944, p. 400).

Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

Guatemala

The Ambassador of Guatemala transmitted to the Secretary of State, with a note of July 11, 1944, the instrument of ratification of the agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration signed in Washington on November 9, 1943. The instrument of ratification, signed by the President of the Republic of Guatemala, is dated June 7, 1944.

The Proclaimed List

[Released to the press July 29]

The Secretary of State, acting in conjunction with the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Acting Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, on July 29, 1944, issued Cumulative Supplement 5 to Revision VII of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, promulgated March 23, 1944.

Part I of Cumulative Supplement 5 contains 55 additional listings in the other American republics and 62 deletions. Part II contains 156 additional listings outside the American republics and 59 deletions.

Visit of Brazilian Director General of Posts and Telegraphs

[Released to the press July 26]

Major Landry Sales Gonçalves, Director General of Posts and Telegraphs of Brazil, has arrived in this country for the purpose of studying censorship, postal and telecommunications operations and facilities of the United States. Major Landry Sales is accompanied by two of his principal assistants, Hamilton Scholl and Demosthenes Braga, postal and telegraphic experts, respectively.

Major Landry Sales is expected to remain in this country approximately three weeks, during which time he plans to visit various cities to observe the operation of the postal and telegraph systems as well as telecommunication manufacturing centers.

Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, will act as host at an official luncheon at the Carlton on Monday, July 31, given by the Department in honor of Major Landry Sales and his party.

Visit of Mexican Rural-Education Specialist

Professor Guillermo Bonilla Segura, head of the Department of Cultural Missions of the Mexican Ministry of Education, is in the United States as a guest of the Department of State. During his visit he will observe rural-education and agricultural-extension programs.

The cultural missions in Mexico, which were organized nearly a quarter of a century ago, were suspended in 1939. They were resumed, however, in 1942, under a new plan which provided for the following types: Missions designed to improve educational standards and living conditions among the Indians, who form a large part of the population of Mexico; missions for workers, especially those in mines and textile factories; and missions for the training of teachers.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Raymond L. Zwemer as Chairman of the Inter-departmental Committee on Cooperation With the American Republics, Office of American Republic Affairs, effective June 17.

Emile Despres as Adviser on European Finance in the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs, Office of Economic Affairs, effective July 4.

Wayne G. Jackson and Eugene V. Rostow as Advisers in the Supply and Resources Division, effective July 8.

Elmer G. Burland as Adviser in the Liberated Areas Division, effective July 8.

Hallett Johnson and Orsen N. Nielsen as Advisers in the Eastern Hemisphere Division, effective July 8.

Robert P. Terrill as Acting Assistant Chief of the Commodities Division, effective July 8.

Charles Bunn as Consultant to the Division of Commercial Policy, effective July 8.

Vernon E. Bundy as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy, effective July 8.

Robert R. Wilson as Consultant on Commercial Treaties to the Division of Commercial Policy, effective July 8.

John M. Cabot as Chief of the Division of Caribbean and Central American Affairs, effective July 1.

Philip O. Chalmers as Acting Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs, effective July 1.

Abbot Low Moffat as Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs, effective July 1. Mr. Moffat will continue as an Adviser in the Liberated Areas Division.

Richard W. Morin as Chief of the Division of Public Liaison, effective July 14.

Norman Burns as Assistant Chief of the Commodities Division, effective July 17.

PUBLICATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Publications of the Department of State (a list cumulative from October 1, 1929). July 1, 1944. Publication 2150. iv, 31 pp. Free.

The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals: Cumulative Supplement No. 5, July 28, 1944, to Revision VII of March 23, 1944. Publication 2153. 60 pp. Free.

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The articles listed below will be found in the July 29 issue of the Department of Commerce publication entitled *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Synthetic Organic Chemicals in Republic of Panama Today", by C. William Cowles, American vice consul, American Embassy, Panamá.

"Dominican Republic in 1943", based on a report from James G. McCargar, third secretary and vice consul, American Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo.